CHAPTER FOUR

PROGRESSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA

SUSANNE SCHRÖTER

Introduction

Since the colonial era, Indonesian women have been active in various associations with aims ranging from the establishment of an Islamic state to the formation of a communist society. The gender models that correspond to these respective political utopias reach from gender equality to a religiously justified model of complementary roles. These polarisations exist to the present day, and it is still a point of heated contention as to whether the Qur'an and Sunna or secular human rights ought to serve as the basis of the contemporary normative order. The present article outlines the political activities of secular and Muslim female political activists since the early twentieth century in Indonesia, analyses ideological differences between various progressive and conservative women's movements, and highlights the cultural and political dynamics of nationalism, secularism and Islamic resurgence in the colonial and postcolonial era. Particular emphasis lies on developments after the fall of the authoritarian regime, and the impacts of democratization.

Communists and Islamists: Opposing sides of Indonesia's women's rights movement in historical perspective

The battle for women's rights in Indonesia is closely tied to the name Raden Ajeng Kartini (1879-1904), a young Javanese woman who at the age of twelve had to leave the Dutch school she had been attending in order to prepare for marriage, as was customary at the time. Kartini resisted her seclusion, and continued her education through independent study. She cultivated several pen friendships, and after placing an ad for pen friends in the Dutch weekly *De Hollandsche Lilie*, to which her father had subscribed for her, the Dutch feminist Estelle Zeehandelaar responded. Through her exchange with Zeehandelaar, Kartini developed her emancipatory ideas, speaking out in particular against polygyny, which was common among the aristocracy at the time. Nevertheless, she ultimately bowed to her father's decision and became the fourth wife of a man who was thirty years her senior. It was with his permission that in 1903 she opened a small school for girls, but she died shortly thereafter while giving birth to her first child (cf. Geertz 1985; Coté 2005).

Kartini quickly became an icon of the newly formed women's movement in Indonesia, which emerged largely from the anticolonial movement. Many organisations that were fighting for national independence also established women's wings, the leaders of which were often the wives of the leaders of the male organisations (cf. Samiuddin and Khanam 2002, 4).

However, this structural dependency did not prevent women activists from increasing their field of action, or from creating their own structures. The first national women's congress convened in 1928 (cf. Robinson 2009, 42ff., on the beginnings of the Indonesian women's movements). Those in attendance passed three resolutions, in which they demanded an increase in the number of girls' schools, the education of young women on issues pertaining to marriage and divorce, and the financial support of widows whose deceased husbands had been state employees. In 1929, a second congress was held and the "Federation of Indonesian Women's Associations" (Perikatan Perempuan Indonesia, PPI) was established, which shortly thereafter changed its name to the "Federation of Indonesian Wives' Associations" (Perikatan Perhimpunan Istri Indonesia, PPII). Saskia Wieringa has suggested that this change in names expressed a commitment to conservative values, which envisaged women to be first and foremost good wives and mothers (cf. Wieringa 1988, 74). At the same time, the emphasis on education was fairly easy to reconcile with such conservatism, since modern wives were expected to be able to competently support their husbands, and to raise their children—the future of Indonesia—to become good, responsible and educated citizens. In 1931, the PPII sent delegates to the international Congress of Asian Women in Lahore, India, where a resolution against polygyny was passed. At subsequent congresses, they passed resolutions to promote literacy and women's access to professional careers. Since the delegates were a rather heterogeneous group, with Muslim and secular activists differing in their views on how to reform family

law, the group chose to emphasise the religious neutrality of the association. However, efforts to preserve unity and maintain a common agenda were not very successful, particularly following the establishment of the radical organisation Isteri Sedar ("Conscious Wives") in 1930. That same year, Isteri Sedar left the umbrella organisation "Indonesian Women's Congress", complaining about the lack of support in the fight against child marriage, the Islamic practice of repudiating wives, and the right of men to marry as many as four women at once. In June 1931, during one of their own assemblies, its members demanded the complete abolition of polygyny, pointing to the policy initiated in Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[i] Ultimately the Indonesian women's movement split on the issue of the legal basis of polygyny. While radical feminist and nationalist organisations demanded an unequivocal condemnation of the practice, presenting a legislative proposal in 1937 along these lines, the Muslim groups unilaterally rejected the initiative as being un-Islamic. Confronted with so much resistance to the proposed law, the colonial government reneged on its support.

Even before independence, women activists had joined together under the "Indonesian Women's Association" (Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia, PERWARI) to support the anticolonial cause.[ii] After independence, the association gave birth to the umbrella organisation "Indonesian Women's Congress" (Kongres Wanita Indonesia, KOWANI), which encompassed fifty-four individual groups. The women's movement's participation in the struggle for independence won women's rights activists public recognition in postcolonial Indonesia. The first post-independence government thus anchored the essential equality of the sexes and women's suffrage in the constitution, and integrated the women's rights activists into the pantheon of anticolonial heroes.

But after independence, the rifts between the various wings of the women's movement grew wider, running increasingly into an overarching antagonism between Muslim and secular-socialist groups. This polarisation reflected the cleavages in Indonesia's political landscape more generally, which, apart from a military that pursued its own interests, comprised a Muslim and a socialist-communist bloc. Many Muslims were disappointed that Indonesia had not been established as an Islamic state,[iii] and they were wary of the first president Sukarno's vision of national unity, which attempted to reconcile nationalism, religion and communism into a single political vision. Muslims felt Islam was being doubly threatened: on the one hand by the military, which had unequivocally positioned itself within the secular-nationalist bloc when it crushed Islamist revolts in South Sulawesi, Aceh and West Java[iv]; and on the other hand by the Indonesian Communist Party, whose 3.5 million members made it the third largest communist party in the world. Muslim landowners repeatedly became embroiled in violent clashes with the communists, who were demanding economic reforms and trying to implement them by "direct action" (*aksi sepihak*). The situation finally escalated on 30 September 1965. After an alleged attempted coup d'état by the 30th of September Movement, during which six generals were kidnapped and murdered, anti-communist officers under General Suharto took control of the government. President Sukarno was removed from office, and a nationwide punitive campaign targeting communists and other left-wing organisations and individuals was initiated. The pogrom, which Suharto himself referred to as the "Season of Machetes" ("Musim Parang"), claimed the lives of at least half a million people. Members of the Muslim organisations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) played an active role in the torture and massacre.[v]

In the course of the events following the attempted coup, the largest Indonesian women's organisation, the "Indonesian Women's Movement" (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, GERWANI), which at its peak counted 1.5 million members,[vi] was crushed. GERWANI had been closely linked to the Communist Party of Indonesia, and had mobilised women not only from the middle class, but also women workers and peasants. Their activities focused on the reform of marriage law, the abolition of polygyny and the elimination of discrimination against women with regard to the right of inheritance. GERWANI was anti-imperialist and revolutionary, and had got into conflicts with not only the Muslim women's organisations, but also with the largest nationalist women's association PERWARI, whose members GERWANI opposed because their membership was drawn mainly from the bourgeois, intellectual elite. GERWANI cultivated a militant ideal of femininity, and its members even trained to become guerrilla fighters.[vii] After the attempted putsch, rumours spread that young GERWANI activists had not only actively participated in the coup, but that they had participated in a particularly gruesome and obscene manner, having ostensibly tortured generals, dismembered them with knives, and then danced on their remains. These accounts, publicised by the media, elicited an immediate response from the Muslim majority, which saw in these reports the confirmation of its worst fears. Thousands of GERWANI activists were raped, tortured and murdered by angry Muslim mobs, and the organisation was dissolved and banned. Thereafter, the state took great pains to prevent the establishment of independent political organisations and of independent women's organisations.

The women's movement and the fight for democracy

This changed in the 1980s. Women activists mobilised to fight for the rights of underprivileged women, as well as women workers and migrants, who often worked under inhumane conditions as maids in neighbouring Asian countries or in the Middle East. Statistical evidence brought yet another issue to the fore: massive

domestic violence, which revealed the state propaganda on the harmonious Indonesian family to be an absolute lie. In 1982, the "Annisa Swasti Foundation" (Yayasan Annisa Swasti) was established to fight against the violent treatment of peasant women and female factory workers. In 1986, the "Centre for the Development of Women's Resources" (Pusat Pegembangan Sumber Daya Wanita) was founded, and it too made the fight against the violent treatment of women part of its agenda. The group "Women's Solidarity Indonesia" (Solidaritas Perempuan) publicised the abysmal working conditions of women migrants, and the crisis centre Kalyanamitra started an anti-rape campaign in 1991. Patriarchal violence thus increasingly became the focus of attention in all women's organisations.

Although most women activists continued to be drawn from the educated middle class, in the 1990s a number of women emerged from the worker's movement and made headlines. The labour leader Dita Sari was arrested; Marsinah, another activist, was murdered in 1993 for her political engagement. And, because the issues of violence, lack of participation, and exploitation also featured on the agendas of international organisations, Indonesian women suddenly received much welcome public attention and considerable financial support. These developments forced the government to engage with the issue of women's rights, such as by establishing a Ministry of Women's Affairs and by reforming family law. Joining in the demand for legal reforms was the "Association of Indonesian Women for Justice" (Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan, APIK), which had been founded in 1995 by the lawyer Nursyabani Katjansungkana.

In the 1990s, the implementation of women's rights came to be increasingly associated with democratisation and general political reforms. The legitimacy of and support for the Suharto government increasingly eroded, and even parts of the military turned against their former patron. The 1997 currency crisis made the situation all the more acute. In order to fulfil the conditions imposed by the IMF, subsidies were cut, which led to a dramatic increase in the price of rice and kerosene, which is used for cooking. The situation in the cities became increasingly precarious, and in many towns plundering was a problem. In the universities, demands that the dictator step down grew louder, and students began to demonstrate and occupy public buildings. Suharto responded with scare tactics and military repression, as well as the arbitrary arrest of student leaders and the violent breakup of demonstrations. In Jakarta, a group was formed that called itself "The Voice of Concerned Mothers" (Suara Ibu Peduli), which distributed milk powder among the needy and protested against the rising prices of basic foodstuffs. On 23 February 1997, about twenty women assembled to publicly express their concerns by praying, singing patriotic songs, and distributing flowers to passers-by. Three activists, Karlina Leksono, Wilasih Noviana and Gadis Arivia, were arrested, tried and convicted. Closely associated to the women of Suara Ibu Peduli, to some extent personally through the activist Gadis Arivia, were the editors of the feminist women's magazine *Jurnal Perempuan*, which prominently featured topics such as sexuality, violence and feminism. One day before Suharto's resignation, the "National Indonesian Women's Coalition for Justice and Democracy" was formed as a union of several organisations, and in December 1998, a national women's congress was convened in Yogyakarta. However, the New Order regime did not step down without first resorting to chaos and violence, in order to delay what had by then become inevitable. In May 1998, unspecified militias, most likely members of the military or hired gangsters, descended on Jakarta's Chinatown, pillaging and murdering hundreds. Women were targeted in particular. They were stripped, sexually humiliated, raped and then, having suffered these tortures, often murdered.[viii]

The end of dictatorship and the dawn of a new era for women

After it became clear that military repression and terror tactics were not going to quell the protests, parliamentary support for Suharto eroded, and he lost the backing of his own party. On 20 May 1998, one million people gathered in the streets of Jakarta to demand the immediate resignation of the President. This time Suharto bowed to public and political pressure, and after thirty-two years in power, he transferred the reins of government to his Vice President, Baracharuddin Jusuf Habibie. Habibie promised reforms and to soon hold elections. Since then, the country has seen three presidents (including one woman): Abdurrahman Wahid, Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono and Megawati Sukarnoputri,[ix] as well as the introduction of a series of reforms, which included the decentralisation of government and the bureaucracy, and the curtailing of the military's influence.

Already under Habibie's transition government, a "National Commission Against Violence Against Women" was formed, which was headed by the university professor Saparinah Sadli. A presidential decree in the year 2000 set in place the policy of "gender mainstreaming", so that since then all ministries and bureaucratic institutions must enforce gender equality and eliminate discrimination against women. The Women's Ministry and the Central Office of Statistics were charged with supervising and evaluating the implemented gender mainstreaming measures. The Ministry cooperates with NGOs and the eighty-four women's research centres that were established at state-run and private universities.[x] The "Women's Studies Research Programme" (Program Studi Kajian Wanita), which had been initiated as early as 1989 by the director of the University of Indonesia, played a pioneering role in university research on women's issues. The universities Gajah Mada in Yogyakarta, Erlangga in Surabaya and Hasanuddin in Makassar followed suit, and today these centres provide important

impulses for the dissemination of feminist topics and the implementation of programmes that promote gender justice. The state-initiated "Family Welfare Movement" (Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK), which had served under the Suharto government to entrench medical and population-control programmes in the archipelago, underwent changes in its name. The term "pembinaan" (leadership) was changed to "perberdayaan" (empowerment). "Hopefully", wrote the women's rights activist Lies Marcoes-Natsir, "the changes made to the organisation's name and policy will engender a more familiar and friendly relationship to the population—and especially now that the PKK shows itself to be more sensitive and attentive to the interests of women" (Marcoes-Natsir 2002 190). Indeed, there are indications that this is the case: For example, in October 2006, the government announced the prohibition of female genital mutilation.

For those organisations which had been established in the 1980s and 1990s, these changes marked a significant improvement in their working environment. But to this day, financial support comes largely from international donors such as the Ford Foundation, the United Nations and other governmental foundations, such as those linked to German political parties. At the same time, state institutions are now showing themselves to be more supportive, either offering some financial support or facilitating access to government authorities. A common issue on the agendas of many governmental and nongovernmental organisations is the prevalence of domestic violence against women and children. Nongovernmental organisations like Rifka Annisa ("Women's Friend"),[xi] Kalyanamitra ("Spiritual Friendship") and the Mitra Perempuan Women's Crisis Centre offer emergency assistance to victims of violence. There are safe houses at which victims may temporarily stay, where they receive medical treatment and psychological as well as legal counselling. In addition, activists try to raise awareness among opinion leaders as to the consequences of violence. Furthermore, they also organise workshops, the attendance of which has often become mandatory for government employees, particularly when activists manage to find local partners prepared to support them. In 2010 in Janto, the capital city of the district of Aceh Besar in Aceh Province, I was able to observe how such workshops are conducted. Haji Maslaila, the district head's wife, supported the effort and turned it into a several-day event that included all sorts of social activities, among them a lecture given by a gender expert from Jakarta, after which there was plenty of opportunity for discussion. The expert first explained in detail the medical consequences that abuse had on women and children, and used the facts presented during her talk to portray the Indonesian family as broken and dysfunctional—the antipode of the conservative Indonesian ideal of harmony and contentment. Of course, some in the audience objected. One official who worked for the local *shari'a* authority insisted that Islam accorded men the right to discipline disobedient women, such as when they did not have dinner ready on time, as their marital duties obliged them to. Immediately there was an outcry among the women in attendance, and it became quite apparent that such views did not reflect those of the mainstream majority.

In peripheral Aceh, such interventions are relatively recent phenomena. On the main island of Java, however, women activists have been at work for much longer, and this with quite some success. In Yogyakarta, a men's group emerged that was vaguely associated with Rifka Annisa, going by the name "Alliance of New Men" (Aliansi Laki-Laki Baru), which now has branches in other parts of Indonesia. The aim of this men's group is to support the women in their fight against violence and discrimination; but they also have their own agenda. As "Alliance of New Men" activists told me in an interview conducted in May 2011, men no longer wish to live as emotional cripples, but seek to become more fully developed human beings. They complained that the Indonesian gender order promotes the cultivation of rage as the only acceptable male emotion, at the expense of other emotions such as sadness, pain, empathy and tenderness. Reflecting on their own very distanced father-son relationships, they hoped that one day they could learn to feel more affection and understanding for their own children, and to have their relationships be defined less by authority.

Closely related to the issue of violence are traditional marriage practices, so-called "betel marriages" (*nikah sirih*) in particular,[xii] that are entered into only under the authority of an imam. Officially, such marriages have no legal status: children born in these relationships have no claim to child support in the event that the marriage is dissolved, and the law treats them as if they were born out of wedlock. Many women do not know that they are accorded the full rights of marriage only if they register the marriage with the government, and so they agree to the much simpler and far less costly procedure of a purely religious marriage. Along these lines, women's organisations such as the "Legal Support Institute for Women/Indonesian Women's Association for Justice" (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum untuk Perempuan/Asosiasi Perempuan Indonesia untuk Keadilan, or LBH APIK) offer legal counselling. LBH APIK was established in 1995 by a group of women lawyers,[xiii] and the organisations work in tandem. While LHB APIK offers practical legal counselling at no charge, including assistance during divorce and child custody proceedings, the women activists also organise campaigns to lobby for reforms in the legal system, and they raise awareness of women's issues in schools and among the police force.

Gender equality has thus become an issue that is widely discussed in Indonesian society, receiving considerable media, scholarly and political attention. Not unlike in other countries, there are numerous programmes that aim to fight discrimination and violence, and to enable the full and equal participation of women in all aspects of life. And yet at the same time, there are just as many endeavours to prevent the realisation of these aims, often involving objections to the idea of gender equality, which, as I will show, are rooted in an Islamic set of ideas.

Muslim women's organisations

Although secular women's organisations, activists and artists have succeeded in gaining media and political attention, they are still only a tiny minority of urban, educated, middle-class women. For this reason their influence is rather limited. Far more influential are the Muslim women's associations, first and foremost among them the two mass organisations known as "Muhammadiyah" and the "Nahdlatul Ulama" (also spelled "Nahdatul Ulama"), which together claim to represent about seventy million Indonesian Muslims. Associated with Muhammadiyah is the women's organisation Aisyiyah,[xiv] established in 1917, and the Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, a group especially for young women that was founded in 1919. The equivalent organisations under the Nahdlatul Ulama are the Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama, established in 1946, and the Fatayat Nahdlatul Ulama, founded in 1950 as the women's youth association.

These Muslim women's organisations have been opposing secular activists' struggle for gender equality since the very beginning; however, they have been changing their profile recently and have appropriated a universal women's rights rhetoric to a certain degree. Historically, institutionally and personally, they are linked to their parent organisations, but have in the last few decades grown more distant from them in the search for their own approach to religion and politics. This process was by no means a harmonious one, and to this day is marked by vociferous debates which however do not simply follow stereotypical gender antagonisms according to which women must always ally themselves with other women and men must always constitute a hindrance to progress. Rather, progressive male members of these organisations join forces with feminists and women's rights activists in finding ways to promote ideas of gender mainstreaming, while conservative men reject any proposal for reform and are supported in their stance by their wives. In order to understand the scope of action available to women activists, along with the context in which political conflicts are fought out, I will briefly portray both organisations.

Inspired by reformist religious thinkers like Muhammad Abduh and Sayyid Jamal al Din al Afghani, the Islamic scholars Ahmad Dahlan and Ahmad Chatib established Muhammadiyah in the Javanese city of Yogyakarta in 1912. Their aim was to rid Islam of supposed distortions and to directly engage with the Qur'an and Sunna. Rather than rely on the findings of one of the four Islamic legal schools (*madhhab*) these clerics propagated the principle of *ijtihad*—the independent, reasoned interpretation of religious sources—and emphasised the importance of public education so that all Muslims would be able to read and understand the Qur'an. They organised literacy campaigns and educated people in the Islamic traditions and in reading the Qur'an. Through these efforts, it was hoped that the traditional village preachers (*kyai*) and the authoritarian system they represented would give way to a modern Muslim community. The Indonesian *kyai* ascribe to the Shafi'i school of jurisprudence, but also integrate many elements of local customs. Their religious practice includes long prayer recitations, extensive chanting sessions and syncretic rites. Saints continue to be worshipped to this day, and followers gather at the graves of religious teachers every year to honour them and to commemorate their deaths. The growing popularity of reformist Islam, however, forced the *kyai* to respond and to form their own organisations. In 1926, the scholar Abdul Wahab Hasbullah founded the Nahdlatul Wathan ("Nation's Awakening/Revival"), which was dedicated to the promotion of traditional Javanese Islam. A network of preachers was formed, which imitated the reformists in creating its own educational system, and then in 1936, the Javanese religious scholar Hasyim Asyari brought this organisation under the aegis of what is today the most influential Islamic organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama ("Revival/Awakening of Religious Scholars").[xv]

From the very beginning, Muhammadiyah mobilised and educated women along with men, and thus continued with the reformist programme first formulated by Muhammad Abduh. It is reported that Ahmed Dahlan personally selected the most intelligent girls in his community and trained them to become leaders in the newly established Aisyiyah (cf. Anwar, Etin 2004, 94). This approach conflicted with established gender norms in several ways, most notably with regard to the religious privileges accorded to men. Traditional Javanese culture placed restrictions on upper-class women, and also did not allow them to become preachers. The leaders of Muhammadiyah did away with these limitations placed on women, and in 1932 issued a decree that women were able to preach the word of God just as men did, and that they therefore were also permitted to leave the home, although only during the daytime with their husband's permission, and never alone (cf. Doorn-Harder 2006, 79).

Despite these remarkable innovations, the members of the Aisyiyah during this period cannot really be considered to have been women's rights activists in the proper sense. Compared to Christian and secular women's rights activists, who had begun to anticipate much earlier the winds of change that heralded a much freer society, the women of Aisyiyah often appeared extremely conservative. Thus, in 1928 at the first Indonesian women's conference in Yogyakarta, the Aisyiyah delegate defended polygyny on the grounds that it supposedly prevented men from having extramarital affairs or frequenting prostitutes. At the same time, Aisyiyah began a campaign against the free social interaction of the sexes. These very conservative, and what others considered to be downright backward positions, set the foundation for a fundamental rift within the Indonesian women's movement (cf. Doorn-Harder 2006, 32).

On the other hand, Aisyiyah had during the early twentieth century tried to develop a synthesis between devout piety and modernity. At a time when very few women wore the veil, Aisyiyah activists covered their

heads, necks and shoulders, and also for very practical reasons wore trousers instead of the traditional sarong. The wearing of trousers in particular, the organisation official Rahmawati Husein recalls,[xvi] provoked much criticism from conservative Muslims, who accused Aisyiyah members of imitating Western women. But according to Rahmawati, dress is an important expression of the Muhammadiyah approach to religion, which is very practice-oriented. Dress must cover the body, but should not to be too constricting. Since the organisation's founding, women activists have focused their activities on education and public health. When I met her in Yogyakarta in August 2005, Rahmawati was one of the coordinators of the Muhammadiyah Programme for Emergency Relief, and was busy with the reconstruction efforts in Aceh following the tsunami that devastated the province in 2004. She organised the reconstruction of schools, clinics and orphanages, assisted radio stations and aquaculture projects, and ran training initiatives especially for women that would help them to earn their own living.[xvii] Rahmawati Husein was a member of the National Commission against Violence against Women, and she was a respected member of her organisation. Muhammadiyah, she told me, was a good framework for social commitment, but with regard to gender equality, it was an organisation in desperate need of reform, since women in leadership positions were still the rare exception rather than the rule.[xviii]

Unlike the Muhammadiyah officials, leading members of the Nahdlatul Ulama were initially quite sceptical with regard to the political and religious participation of women. The *kyai* view of women was conservative and very much concerned with preserving village gender asymmetries. It was only twenty years after its founding that the women's wing, the Muslimat Nahdlatul Ulama, was established,[xix] primarily to win support from women voters. Around this time, political organisations in Indonesia had discovered women as an important target group, so that even a conservative religious organisation such as the Nahdlatul Ulama felt the need to act. An unintended consequence of these developments was that the women who had been mobilised into women's wings of their respective parties began to make their presence in the political arena felt, and were able to push through a number of reforms. For instance, despite initial resistance from male members, women were permitted to become members of the legislative assembly after 1951, and after 1961 they were also permitted to become village leaders (*kepala desa*). In principle, they even could be elected to the highest levels of leadership, although in practice they rarely succeeded.[xx] During a conference in 1997, it was decided that women could occupy any political office, including that of the President of the Republic of Indonesia. Certainly not all *kyai* supported the modernising reforms of the party, and in 2004, fifteen of the disaffected issued a fatwa in which they denied that a woman could occupy the presidency (cf. Doorn-Harder 2006, 82). These conflicts are not surprising, however. In an organisation with forty million members, there are multiple occasions for difference. And so it is not surprising that members have expressed the entire spectrum of gender ideals, ranging from conservative- patriarchal to views reflecting the gender ideals supported by international women's rights organisations. Muhammadiyah is no less heterogeneous, and their members also range in views from fundamentalist-patriarchal to fiery feminist.

Despite the uncompromising stances of many members, both organisations are undergoing an interesting development that allows women and men to discuss and disseminate emancipatory ideas and to realise them through social reform projects. In this process, the women's youth wings of both organisations, the Nasyiatul Aisyiyah and the Fatayat NU, play an important role, even though ultimately they are bound by the decisions made by men in the male-dominated superordinate organisations.[xxi]

The Fatayat NU was established in 1950 on the initiative of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) leader Kyai Dahlan, in an attempt to increase the NU's electoral base and help it attain the status of a political party.[xxii] Three women, the so called "triumvirate" (*Tiga Serangkai*), were charged with establishing the new organisation (cf. Arnez 2009, 3). From the very beginning, Fatayat NU activists participated in religious education, both preaching and carrying out Islamic rituals. This was a field in which they had considerable experience, since the majority of Fatayat NU members were daughters of *kyai* and personally familiar with Islamic schools. Apart from religious activities, the promotion of education was an important field of engagement. The activists initiated literacy classes and were instrumental in disseminating the Indonesian language. Much like the Muslimat NU, whose members had since the late 1960s been heavily involved in activities promoting public health and family planning, Fatayat NU activists also included on their agenda birth control, as well as medical care for mothers and their children. In the 1980s, the organisation was able to draw on its past involvements in these areas in order to network with international organisations such as UNICEF, thereby gaining access to new financial resources to continue their work. The issue of women's reproductive rights most certainly corresponded to what conservative members of the Nahdlatul Ulama considered to be an appropriate domain of women's public involvement. Nobody objected to village education campaigns in which villagers were taught basic skills in proper infant care, child nutrition and AIDS prevention. Clinics were established and counselling centres opened where even poor women could seek competent help. However, the concerns of those who seek assistance go far beyond a few tips on proper hygiene and nutrition. The most pressing concerns were very different: child marriage, polygyny, inequality between women and men with regard to the right to divorce, and the very prevalent issue of marital violence. Closely linked to these education efforts is the campaign to prohibit "temporary marriage", a practice that is gaining popularity. The Indonesian version of this Shi'ite practice is

popular among Saudi men in particular, who pay village leaders a fee for their permission to temporarily marry Javanese girls and women. Quite often these are minors who are given forged identification documents that indicate an age much older that the girl's actual age. Many of these girls and young women become pregnant, and because abortion is illegal in Indonesia, they resort to dangerous procedures to end their pregnancies. Approximately two million abortions are carried out in Indonesia every year. The head of the Fatayat NU, Maria Ulfah Anshor, has taken up this issue in her research (cf. Anshor 2006), and has included on the organisation's medical policy agenda the right to "safe" abortions.

These issues that the Fatayat NU set on its agenda were extremely provocative, given that they represented a challenge to the authority of the *kyai* and their views of an unassailable gender order in which any disturbance in family harmony was always blamed on the women. Yet the women activists did not back down. In the late 1990s, the Fatayat NU initiated a programme to promote women's rights (Penguatan Hak-hak Perempuan), and in the year 2000 they established a consultancy for the empowerment of women (Lembaga Konsultasi dan Pemberdayaan Perempuan), which was comprised of twenty-six satellite departments. An increasing number of activists also came out as having themselves been victims of domestic violence, and the organisation not only provided counselling services, but also promoted self-help among these women. Together with the victims, they searched for solutions to their specific problems. They helped victims to initiate divorces, and promoted projects that helped women achieve economic independence so that in the worst-case scenario they would be able to support themselves. This provoked numerous conflicts with family, neighbours, religious leaders and politicians, and even among the women activists themselves. Although a departure from Javanese conceptions of womanhood (i.e. as the subservient, stoic wife prepared to endure whatever suffering life had in store for her) was welcomed by most women, many feared that a departure from this gender norm would cause them to become stigmatised as sinful or even un-Islamic. Fatayat NU's task was thus to clearly show that the reforms for which they were pushing did in fact conform with Islamic principles.

In order to show that their comprehensive programme of reforms was compatible with the principles of Islam, Fatayat NU activists, much like their Iranian and North African sisters, had to undertake their own exegesis of the Qur'an. Women scholars at the various centres for women's studies at universities around the country, as well as at several independent educational institutions, began to reinterpret important Quranic verses and prophetic traditions from a feminist perspective. In recent years, they have published innumerable brochures, pamphlets and monographs to show that Islam's emphasis on justice also entails equality between the sexes. Among nongovernmental organisations, the "Fahmina Institute for Islamic Studies" in Cirebon plays a particularly active role. It was established in 1999 by a group of Muslim intellectuals who had worked in Islamic education, and its mission was to support the development of a democratic and just Indonesia. In its efforts, it focused on three central issues: Islam and democracy, Islam and gender, and communitarian autonomy. The Institute has websites in both English and Indonesian, publishes brochures for opinion leaders, and also organises workshops, panel discussions and educational programmes. The organisation's influence among Islamic groups is not least due to the fact that it is represented by such highly regarded religious scholars as Kyai Muhammad Husein, who in his own publications presents gender-equal interpretations of the Qur'an, and publically advocates a change in the Islamic normative order.[xxiii]

New piety and Islamic morality

Both secular and liberal Muslim women activists, backed by liberal scholars, theologians and politicians, have made great strides in the past few years. However, the changes are not uncontroversial. The shift to democracy and the manifold programmes to promote gender equality are only one side of the Indonesian reform process. The other side is an Islamic revival that set in before Suharto's fall from power, which is manifest in the emergence of conservative pious movements—as well as the increase in Islamist violence. However, these developments were far from unexpected. Since the 1970s, students have been joining an Islamist revivalist movement that came to call itself the "Salman Movement" (Gerakan Salman), after the Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute of Technology. Its leader was the charismatic teacher Imaduddin Abdulrahim. The young Islamists criticised the increasing materialism and the moral decay that they saw taking its toll on the country as a result of the increasing orientation of a broad segment of the Indonesian population towards a Western lifestyle. To put a stop to this social decay, they demanded a return to the fundamental principles of Islam (cf. Hefner 1997, 91f). But because political Islam in postcolonial Indonesia became subject to state control, due to past conflicts with secular political factions,[xxiv] these demands were never put into practice. The clandestine student groups kept a low profile and discussed their ideas only among themselves. In the 1990s, however, the political climate suddenly began to change. Suharto's political apparatus was in crisis, opposition political factions gained influence, and the dictator began to look for new allies to maintain his grip on power. Allies, he believed, were to be found among Muslim political groups. In 1990, he created a "Union of Islamic Intellectuals in Indonesia", and in 1991 he supported the opening of the first Islamic bank and allowed girls to wear head scarves (*jilbab*) in school, something that previously had been strictly prohibited. That same year, he undertook a pilgrimage to Mecca with his wife. Yet his efforts to reach out to the leaders of Islamic groups and to cultivate a

public image as a pious Muslim were largely ineffective. Although Muslims took advantage of the wider scope of action now available to them, they did not back Suharto, but rather joined forces with the democracy movement that was gaining momentum.

After the end of the dictatorship, the leaders of the Islamic revival movement became popular public personalities. Since they had largely refused to let themselves be co-opted by Suharto, they were able to present themselves as agents of reform and democracy, and took on influential roles in society. Since then, Indonesia has undergone a process of political and cultural Islamisation, the consequences of which remain to be seen, particularly with regard to the situation of women.[xxv]

One important force in these developments is the "Party for Welfare and Justice" (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), which has its roots in Islamist university campus groups, and which first participated in national elections under the name "Justice Party" (Partai Keadilan), then receiving only 1.36% of the votes. Under a new name, the "Party for Justice and Welfare" managed to attain 7.3% of the votes in the 2004 elections, and since then it has become a noteworthy political force at not only the national, but also the provincial and municipal levels.[xxvi] The party's agenda emphasises both education and piety. Its members are popular for their unequivocal anti-corruption stance, and also because they espouse a work ethic that is remarkable by Indonesian standards. They have shown themselves to be strict adherents of Islamic values. The PKS enjoys support particularly among the female electorate, and at public events, its activists play an important role. Many women members of the political cadre have academic backgrounds and present themselves in a very self-confident manner.[xxvii] The sociologist Rachel Rinaldo considers this to be a new middle-class habitus (cf. Rinaldo 2008; 2010).

The anthropologist Suzanne Brenner suggests another reason why young women join Islamist organisations. Brenner conducted ethnographic field research among young women activists in Yogyakarta and Solo (two cities in Central Java) who were attracted to radical groups and demonstrated their commitment to Islam by adhering to a Muslim dress code (Brenner 1996, 674). These women, according to Brenner, are searching for an Islamic modernity beyond the western model. They reject the latter on the grounds that it is materialist, immoral and godless. They even knowingly risk alienating their parents, sometimes breaking with them entirely. Moreover, they reject the privileged position that tradition accords to the older generation, rebelling against intergenerational relationships of authority and demanding the recognition of their religious and moral leadership abilities. My own interviews conducted in 2005 with female students who had joined the radical Islamic group Hizbut Tahrir confirm Brenner's portrayal in a striking way. With great self-confidence, these women insisted they were the leaders of their families and that even their fathers had recognised their ultimate moral authority. In one case, a young woman claimed to have saved her polygynous family from breakup, encouraging her cold-hearted father to show more empathy and care and also to take on a more honest professional work ethic. She asserted her independence when she volunteered for the disaster relief effort that was deployed to the province of Aceh after the tsunami struck in 2005, informing her father simply by SMS of her plans to depart immediately. His response, she recounted with a self-confident smile, was to silently accept her decision. In other cases, however, these self-proclaimed religious teachers have met with less acceptance and had to withstand their parents' criticism, in some cases even facing the consequence of being thrown out of the house. To some extent, all these cases fundamentally amount to instances of post-adolescent rebellion, which are quite familiar in western societies and are regarded by young people and young adults as a necessary part of becoming an independent individual. Conflicts with the social environment serve to strengthen the sense of community among the rebels, leading to the emergence of a sense of *communitas* in which members relate to each other closely and exclusively.

The communitarian aspect is consciously manipulated by many of the organisations in order to cultivate a sense of solidarity among the young adults and to tie them more closely to the organisation. As I could observe at the Daarut Tauhid community in 2008, new members are subject to a strategically effective repertoire of group dynamics upon entry: they must spend several days in the wilderness engaging in physically demanding games and activities, and they learn that by trusting in God and the organisation's leaders, they can achieve more than they ever thought was possible. A further factor in their choosing to live a pious lifestyle, and to join a group of those who choose likewise, has to do with the value attributed to religion and morality. Fifteen years after Suzanne Brenner conducted her study, Claudia Nef also conducted ethnographic field research among Islamist students in Yogyakarta and discovered that the pursuit of a conservative Islamic morality is inextricably linked to the idea of a moral and happy society (c.f. Nef 2011).

Islamism therefore presents itself as a combination of scouting adventure, self-discovery retreat and grand mission which together impart meaning on the lives of individuals who would otherwise be inevitably disappointed by modernity's promise of development and material welfare. This has drawn quite a following, and is even attractive to those who until now had felt at home in one of the mass organisations like Muhammadiyah and the Nahdlatul Ulama. "They are stealing our mosques", complained one of the NU cadre members whom I interviewed in 2010 and 2011 in Yogyakarta. One reason for the growing attractiveness of more radical Islamic groups is that the "old" parties no longer offer real political alternatives, but are now only viewed as an option for less committed Muslims. Another reason is the lack of strong differentiation between the established mass organisations and the young radical groups. In many regards, the ideal society envisioned by Muhammadiyah and the NU closely resembles the one espoused by the PKS, Hizbut Tahrir and other radical

groups. For example, the NU fatwa council issued a decree in 2010 that preadolescent girls could marry, since the Prophet himself had married a child, namely the six-year-old Aisha. The majority of NU members are conservative and do not object to such customs—even if the Fatayat NU tirelessly tries to educate the public regarding the problematic nature of child marriage. Even with regard to polygyny, the mass organisations have much in common with the radical groups. Women's organisations would prefer to have the practice outlawed, or at least have it be socially discouraged, but a good number of highly regarded, influential men in their own organisations have cultivated a public image as polygynists.

With regard to issues concerning an Islamic lifestyle, the differences also tend to be more of degree than kind. This became clear over the past few years during a nationwide debate concerning an initiative that would have made pornography and pornographic behaviour (*pornoaxi*) a crime—one that covered a wide array of conduct, including: the wearing of bikinis, sleeveless shirts, or traditional Javanese and Balinese women's attire; the reading of erotic literature; the display of naked or scantily clad bodies in works of art or photography; and the showing of film scenes featuring sexually explicit acts. Such offences were to be punished by fines and even lengthy prison terms. But the law not only targeted those who were caught in these acts, it also targeted those whose lifestyles were an offence to self-proclaimed Muslim guardians of public morals: unmarried couples, gays and lesbians, and adulterers.[xxviii]

On 8 March 2006, two hundred women in Jakarta protested against the proposed law. They became the focus of worldwide media attention, but their modest numbers indicated that they were not backed by the support of the majority of the population. Muslim organisations, on the other hand, were able to mobilise hundreds of thousands of people to take to the streets to protest in favour of the ban on "pornography".[xxix] On 30 October 2008, Parliament passed the law, and on 26 November it was signed by the President of the Republic—although in a much less stringent form than had initially been proposed.[xxx] Many Indonesians now hope that the Islamists are satisfied with what they have accomplished, and that they will in future refrain from actually trying to use the law to set an example. But serious doubts were cast on these hopes just two years after the law's passing, when it was used to bring a spectacular case to court. The singer of the music group "Peterpan" was sentenced in Bandung to a prison term of three years for appearing in "pornographic" videos that were available on the internet.

The pornography debate was the culmination of a discourse on the moral turn under the banner of Islam. This discourse is embedded in a process of cultural Islamisation which is very prominent in the Indonesian public sphere. More and more, women are wearing Islamic dress; [xxxi] bookshops are selling Islamic women's magazines, Islamic self-help books and Islamic devotional literature; storefront mannequins are displaying Islamic fashions; and movie posters are depicting women with veiled faces and men with Islamic head coverings. Islamic boy bands, so-called "Nasyid" groups, are extremely popular. Islamic television preachers enjoy sensational viewer ratings and Islamic consumer goods dominate an ever-expanding market.[xxxii] Compared to other countries in the Islamic world, this new form of piety takes on a rather playful form. The women who pose in the Islamic lifestyle magazines are attractive, smile at the reader seductively and wear breathtakingly high heels. At Islamic fashion shows, extremely made up models wearing outlandish turbans and exquisite fabrics exude undeniable sex appeal. On television shows, veiled women dance alongside women wearing miniskirts singing kitsch love songs, and popular Islamic love stories embed moral lessons within portrayals of feminine seductiveness. Indonesian Islam is therefore still comparatively liberal and full of a certain joie de vivre, and many Indonesian Muslims believe one should not give too much importance to the belligerent rhetoric and occasional bouts of violence coming from Islamic radicals. They are no doubt correct. In a country with 240 million residents, one cannot expect that the state control all its citizens. And yet there are signs indicating that Islamists are appropriating not only the culture, but also politics and the law, and that they are setting precedents that could pave the way for pious intolerance and misogyny.

Among these signs are laws and new administrative guidelines that are rooted in *shari'a*.[xxxiii] For the most part, they pertain to the keeping of the fast during Ramadan, i.e. to refrain from eating, drinking, gambling, and again, from any kind of "immoral behaviour". Under the guise of combatting prostitution, women in various regions are forbidden from leaving the house after dark unless accompanied by their husbands or a close male relative; the Islamic dress code is strictly enforced, and unmarried couples who are caught together in secluded areas are mistreated and subject to criminal prosecution. Decisive is the implementation of Islamic law in the province of Aceh, where the population, by waging war for several decades, forced the central government in Java to reform the entire legal system in accordance with the principles of *shari'a*. Since 2002, one Islamic law after another has been ratified, and in 2009, Parliament passed a new criminal law, the "Qanun Jinayat", that not only allows for public whippings to punish moral offences, but also stoning to punish adultery.[xxxiv] The new legal situation has led to numerous attacks and acts of violence against women as well as men. Marauding zealots publicly shave the heads of unveiled women, resentful citizens accuse their neighbours of committing adultery, and the district head Ramli M.S. tried to prohibit women from wearing pants (cf. *Jakarta Post*, 28 October 2009). Those who did not obey the decree were to be forcibly re-attired or even thrown in jail. In an interview with the *Jakarta Globe* (18 August 2010), he unabashedly declared that women who did not conform to the new dress code had no cause to complain should they get raped, since their dress patently invited men to do so. A newly established religious police (Wilayatul Hisbah) searches houses and offices looking for unwed couples,

and people charged with having committed so-called moral offences (*khalwat*) have been brought to trial. Since the summer of 2005, there have been repeated instances of women being publically whipped for having violated Islamic law.[xxxv] In other parts of Indonesia, too, reports of attacks against women are becoming more numerous, particularly against working women who return home late in the evening. In West Java, for example, a young veiled woman was snatched by self-proclaimed guardians of public morals, pulled into a bus and reprimanded for having been outside the home after dark alone, without being accompanied by her husband. After that, the men pulled off the woman's veil and shaved her head (cf. Noedrin 2002, 179). One may object that these are exceptional occurrences, and that most Indonesians experience nothing of the like, but such hopes are unfounded. In March 2012, Suryadharma Ali, Minister of Religious Affairs, publically announced to the press that the length of women's skirts ought to be legally regulated. The anti-pornography law allows for such supplementary legislation, and there are actors who take advantage of this in order to discipline women and to subject them to a new moral order. This new order, it must be noted, is also supported by many women, especially those who have joined Muslim organisations with the expressed aim of putting a stop to the secular women's liberation movement, which they regard as being too oriented towards the "godless West". The extent to which they will succeed in their endeavour remains to be seen, but what is certain is that they are having a profound and lasting impact on Indonesian society and its gender order.

Conclusion

In Indonesia, conflicts between secular and Muslim activists over the gender order can be traced back to the colonial era. Muslim women activists, who had developed their own emancipatory agenda that included, for example, the promotion of education for girls, generally rejected the demands of secular women activists when they felt these did not conform to Islamic teachings. In order to overcome the impasse and to reconcile feminist with Islamic positions, Muslim feminists tried in the 1990s to achieve a middle ground by interpreting the Qur'an and Sunna from a feminist perspective. However, both secular and Muslim feminists have come under increasing pressure from conservative Muslim women who wish to achieve the complete transformation of Indonesian society in line with Islamic principles. These conservative women reject feminist reinterpretations of Islamic sources as religiously unacceptable innovations (*bid'ah*), favouring a scripturalist approach to the Qur'an and Sunna. The undeniable achievements of feminists, which include various women's empowerment programmes, are now being undercut by Islamic bylaws and regulations, and in Aceh by the introduction of Islamic penal law. Surveys show that the majority of Indonesians would support the introduction of *shari'a*, which attests to the fact that the Islamic resurgence is a bottom-up project that is the outcome of Islam's increasing rootedness in Indonesian society. Of further concern is the blurring of the boundaries between radical groups and the major Muslim organisations like Muhammadiyah and the NU, which had generally been considered quite liberal; to some extent, the boundaries between these groups have now disappeared altogether. Particularly with regard to the regulation of (female) sexuality and the position of women within the family and society, there is a broadly based consensus between conservative/radical Muslim groups and the traditionally more moderate Muhammadiyah and NU. Anti-feminist countermovements in particular are successful in Indonesia because they coincide with a zeitgeist that gives priority to pious assertions over social facts, while also showing a complete lack of understanding for the principle of equality that liberal and feminist actors value so highly. Rather, it is hoped that compliance with religiously legitimated norms and values will be more effective in solving earthly problems than women's empowerment measures or a seemingly foreign women's rights agenda. The cultural Islamisation of Indonesian society and the growing importance of religion as the ultimate justification of the social order therefore constitute a serious challenge to the promotion of women's rights and gender justice.

Notes

[i] Atatürk prohibited polygyny in Turkey in 1926 as part of his secularisation and modernisation programme. However, in practice polygyny continued to exist, and today AKP politicians are among the most prominent to defend this custom, arguing that it is part of Islamic law.

[ii] The war of independence lasted several years. The Dutch East Indies were conquered by the Japanese in 1942 and occupied until 1945. During this time, political forces aiming to achieve an independent Indonesian state were able to organise themselves, and they began to form international alliances. After the Japanese were defeated, Sukarno declared Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945. The Dutch government, however, tried until December 1949 to reconquer the colony, or at least to bring certain areas under its influence. Under international pressure, also from the United Nations, Queen Juliana signed the transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949. During the Dutch military campaigns, women's organisations had supported Indonesian guerrilla fighters logistically. On the importance of nationalist ideas in the early women's movement, see also Mariyah (2002, 212f.).

[iii] In order to integrate the numerous Christians of the "outer islands" into the independent republic and to prevent secession, Sukarno founded the newly independent state on pluralist principles, against the express wishes of influential Muslim leaders. Under this pluralist state ideology, the members of state-recognised religions were granted equal rights.

[iv] In these regions, Muslims announced the establishment of autonomous Islamic areas ("Darul Islam"), which they saw as comprising a larger "Islamic State of Indonesia" ("Negara Islam Indonesia"). Until the mid-1960s, armed Islamic groups known as the "Islamic Army of Indonesia" fought against the National Army of Indonesia (cf. Schröter 2007, 154-159).

[v] The Nahdlatul Ulama legitimised its activities in Java by referring to them as part of a "holy war". For more on these events, see for example Hefner (1990, 212ff.).

[vi] GERWANI emerged from a previous organisation called the "Movement of Conscious Women" (Gerakan Wanita Sedar, GERWIS) that was established in 1950. GERWIS tended to recruit its members from the educated elite and were therefore rather few in number. Only once the organisation changed its political orientation and began to mobilise the poorer segments of society was GERWIS able to transform itself into a mass political organisation, after which it changed its name to GERWANI.

[vii] According to Wieringa, they were inspired by the mythical hero Srikandi, whose adventures are recounted in the traditional shadow puppet theatre *wayang* (cf. Wieringa 1992, 108).

[viii] The German human rights activist Marianne Klute recounted these events in an article (cf. Klute 1998).

[ix] Megawati Sukarnoputri is one of the daughters of Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia.

[x] On the institutional measures to promote the advancement of women in the post-Suharto era, cf. also Parawansa (2002).

[xi] Rifka Annisa was established as early as 1993.

[xii] The term "betel marriage" is derived from the widespread Indonesian ritual of offering and consuming betel leaf, lime and areca nuts at weddings. The unripe alkaline areca nuts are rolled into betel leaves along with some lime and then chewed like gum. The alkaloid has a stimulating effect, and in high doses is toxic.

[xiii] Among the founding members was the well-known women's rights activist Nursyabani Katjasungkana.

[xiv] However, Aisyiyah only became part of Muhammadiyah officially in 1924.

[xv] On the history of the organisation, see, for example, Bush (2009) and Fealy (2007).

[xvi] Interview with Rahmawati Husein.

[xvii] On the social and education work carried out by Muslim women's organisations, see also Marcoes-Natsir (2000; 2002).

[xviii] On the difficulties of electing women to leadership positions within the organisation, see also Syamsiyatun (2008).

[xix] The Muslimat NU existed as early as 1940, although as a subsidiary of the Nahdlatul Ulama. Six years later it became an independent organisation, although it continued to have ties to the Nahdlatul Ulama.

[xx] Doorn-Harder (2006, 81) mentions three women (Nyai Choiriyah Hasym, Nyai Fatimah and Nyai Mahmudah Mawardi) who between 1950 and 1960 held positions of power in the national party leadership.

[xxi] The activist Lies Marcoes-Natsir notes that although Aisyiyah is legally autonomous, in practice the scope of action of Aisyiyah activists is still circumscribed by the male-dominated parent organisation (Marcoes-Natsir 2000, 137).

[xxii] On the history of the Fatayat NU, cf. Arnez (2009).

[xxiii] Kyai Husein is one of the founders of the Institute, and during the early stages of its development he provided it a place to gather and meet in the *pesantren* that he ran, the Dar al-Tauhid. For an impression of his liberal ideas, see for example Husein (2001; 2004; 2008).

[xxiv] In the recent Indonesian past, Islam has played a varied role. Islamic organisations led the anticolonial struggle against the Dutch, and many of its leaders hoped for the erection of a postcolonial Islamic state. The first president of the Indonesian Republic, Sukarno, initially compromised with the supporters of political Islam, but then decided to give priority to a multi-religious state ideology. Following this decision, there were violent uprisings, and several Muslim areas declared their autonomy under an "Islamic State of Indonesia" ("Negara Islam Indonesia"). On this, see Dijk (1981). These conflicts were finally resolved militarily, and the supporters of political Islam were pushed to the political margins. From this point on, Islam became highly suspect in the world's largest Islamic nation, and the state immediately put to a stop to any attempts by Muslims to establish independent political organisations.

[xxv] The early years of the reform period were marked by Islamist attacks and religiously infused local conflicts that also raised concerns internationally. But the state was able to resolve these crises and bring radical groups under state control. See also Ahnaf (2006); Hefner (2005); Schröter (2001; 2003; 2007; 2008).

[xxvi] Scholarly analyses mostly focus on investigating the impact these successes will have on the young Indonesian democracy. See, for example, Diederich (2002).

[xxvii] I had the opportunity in Yogyakarta in August 2005 to interview PKS women leaders on the challenges of having both a family and a career. I was surprised to discover that these women admitted to the difficulties of trying to reconcile the two; nonetheless, they had found ways to do so. Every one of the women I interviewed had several children and a full-time academic job, and was also an activist. However, the remarkable careers of these Asian women, which seem impressive to women in the West, are only possible thanks to a situation in which every academic household employs badly paid domestic staff who take care of time-consuming everyday tasks like cleaning, laundry, shopping, cooking and child care.

[xxviii] People living in those regions of Indonesia not populated by a Muslim majority regarded the intensifying discussions of Islamic morality as culturally discriminatory. The Balinese feared that the tourist industry would collapse, and threatened to secede from the republic. As a result, they and the Papuans, among whom separatist ideas have been particularly popular anyway, were granted special rights. The feminist Nursyahbani Katjasungkana criticised the cultural blindness of those supporting the "anti-pornography" law, but a member of the "Council of Indonesian Islamic Scholars" (Majelis Ulama Islam, MUI) responded baldly that a culture should be banished to the museum if it could not be made to conform with Islam. See also David (2006).

[xxix] Many also had placards demanding the implementation of *shari'a* and condemning liberalism. Anti-pornography demonstrations were interspersed with vocal rejections of pluralist society and with demands for an Islamic state.

[xxx] The number of articles initially was to be ninety-three, but was finally reduced to thirty. Public kissing, for example, was struck from the list of punishable offences. See Hoepfner (2009, 36).
[xxxi] On the development of Islamic women's fashion and its advertisement on Indonesian television, see Ida (2008). In her article, the author emphasises that the Islamic fashion presented in the popular magazines is expensive and really only worn by elites.
[xxxii] On Islamic pop culture, see Barendregt (2011).
[xxxiii] Polls show that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims support the implementation of *shari'a*. See, for example, Ottendörfer and Ziegenhain (2008, 53).
[xxxiv] This legislation, however, met with resistance from Governor Irwandi Yussuf, who initially refused to sign the legislative initiative into law. On the introduction of *shari'a* in Aceh, see Grossmann (2011).
[xxxv] However, not only women are subject to public whippings. Men suffer this punishment as well, particularly for such offences as adultery, gambling, and the consumption of alcohol. Most of those convicted and sentenced are, in fact, men.

References

Ahnaf, Muhammad Iqbal. 2006. *Images of the Other as Enemy. Radical Discourse in Indonesia*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Anwar, Etin. 2004. "'Directed' Women's Movements in Indonesia." *Hawwa* 2(1): 90-112.

Arnez, Monika. 2009. "Empowering Women through Islam; Fatayat NU Between Tradition and Change." *Journal of Islamic Studies,* Advanced Access, First published 29 June, doi:10.1093/jis/etp025.

Barendregt, Bart. 2011. "Pop, Politics and Piety. Nasyid Boy Band Music in Muslim Southeast Asia." In *Islam and Popular Culture in Indonesia and Malaysia*, ed. by Andrew N. Weintraub, 235-256. London: Routledge.

Brenner, Suzanne. 1999. "On the Public Intimacy of the New Order. Images of Women in the Popular Indonesian Print Media." *Indonesia* 67: 13-38.

Bush, Robin. 2009. *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power and Politics in Indonesia*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Coté, Joost. 2002. "Raden Ajeng Kartini. The Experience and Politics of Colonial Education." In *Gender, Colonialism and Education*, ed. by Joyce Goodman and Jane Martin, 199-224. London: Frank Cass Publishers.

—. 2005. *On Feminism and Nationalism: Kartini's Letters to Stella Zeehandelaar 1899-1903.* Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University.

David, Bettina. 2006. "Porno-Aktionismus. Indonesien zensiert die eigene Kultur." ["Porn activism. Indonesia censors its own culture."] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 April.

Diederich, Mathias. 2002. "A Closer Look at *Dakwah* and Politics in Indonesia. The *Partai Keadilan*." *Archipel* 64:101-115.

Dijk, Kees van. 1981. *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam. The Darul Islam in Indonesia.* The Hague: Nijhoff.

Doorn-Harder, Pieternella van. 2006. *Women Shaping Islam: Indonesian Women Reading the Qur'an.* Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Fealy, Greg. 2007. "The Political Contingency of Reform-mindedness in Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama." In *Islamic Legitimacy in a Plural Asia*, ed. by Anthony Reid and Michael Gilsenan, 139-153. London: Routledge.

Geertz, Hildred. 1985. *Letters of a Javanese Princess*, by Raden Ajeng Kartini. Lanham: University of America Press.

Grossmann, Kristina. 2013. *Gender, Islam, Aktivismus. Handlungsräume muslimischer Aktivistinnen nach dem Tsunami in Aceh* ["Gender, Islam, activism. Opportunities for action for Muslim activists in Aceh after the Tsunami"]. Berlin: RegioSpectra.

Hefner, Robert W. 1997. "Islamization and Democratization in Indonesia." In *Islam in the Era of Nation-states. Political and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia*, ed. by Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvatich, 75-128. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

—. 1990. *The Political Economy of Mountain Java*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hoepfner, Maren. 2009. "Das Pornographie-Gesetz in Indonesien. Eine Gefahr für den Pluralismus?" ["The pornography law in Indonesia. A threat to pluralism?"] *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 1: 31-45.

Husein, Muhammad Kyai. 2008. "Taking Up Traditions for Justice and Democracy." Opening speech marking seven years of the Fahmina Institute. Available online at: http://fahmina.or.id/en/berita/14/577-opening-speech-khutbah-iftitah.html.

—. 2004. *Islam rahmat perempuan* ["Islam honours women"]. Yogyakarta: LKiS.

—. 2001. *Fiqh perempuan. Refleksi kiai atas wacana agama dan gender* ["Female jurisprudence. Islamic scholars' reflections on religious and gender issues"]. Yogyakarta: LKiS.

Marcoes-Natsir, Lies. 2000. "Aisyiyah. Between Worship, Charity and Professionalism." In *Indonesian Women. The Journey Continues*, ed. by Carla Bianpoen and Mayling Oey-Gardiner, 125-138. Canberra: The Australian National University.

—. 2002. “Women’s Grassroots Movements in Indonesia. A Case Study of the PKK and Islamic Women’s Organisations.” In *Women in Indonesia. Gender, Equity and Development,* ed. by Kathryn Robinson and Sharon Bessell, 187-197. Singapore: ISEAS.

Mariyah, Chusnul. 1995. “Gender and Patriarchy in Indonesian Politics.” *Inside Indonesia* 42: 18-20.

Nef, Claudia. 2011. “Standing Up for Morals.” *Inside Indonesia* 103. Available online at: www.insideindonesia.org/edition-103/standing-up-for-morals-14011400.

Ottendörfer, Eva and Patrick Ziegenhain. 2008. “Islam und Demokratisierung in Indonesien.” [“Islam and democratization in Indonesia.”] In *Religion und Identität. Muslime und Nicht-Muslime in Südostasien* [“Religion and identity. Muslims and non-Muslims in Southeast Asia”], ed. by Fritz Schulze and Holger Warnk, 43-64. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

Rinaldo, Rachel. 2010. “The Islamic Revival and Women’s Political Subjectivity in Indonesia.” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 33(4): 422-31.

—. 2008. “Muslim Women, Middle Class Habitus, and Modernity in Indonesia.” *Contemporary Islam* 2(1): 23-39.

Robinson, Kathryn. 2009. *Gender, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia*. London: Routledge.

Samiuddin, Abida and Rashida Khanam. 2002. *Muslim Feminism and Feminist Movement: Southeast Asia*. Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House.

Schröter, Susanne. 2008. “Die Debatte um religiösen Pluralismus in Indonesien.” [“The debate about religious pluralism in Indonesia.”] In *Religion und Identität. Muslime und Nicht-Muslime in Südostasien* [“Religion and identity. Muslims and non-Muslims in Southeast Asia”], ed. by Fritz Schulze and Holger Warnk, 1-22. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.

—. 2007. “Fundamentalismen und religiös motivierte Gewalt in Indonesien.” [“Fundamentalism and religiously motivated violence in Indonesia.”] In *Terrorismus und Fundamentalismus—Herausforderung der modernen Welt* [“Terrorism and fundamentalism. A challenge for the modern world”], ed. by Thomas Kolnberger, 142-167. Vienna: Magnus-Essen.

—. 2003. “Religiöse Mobilisierungen in Indonesien.” [“Religious mobilisations in Indonesia.”] In *ASIEN* 89: 26-46.

—. 2001. “Lokale oder nationale Identität? Ethnische und religiöse Interpretationen sozialer Konflikte in Indonesien.” [“Local or national identity? Ethnic and religious interpretations of social conflicts in Indonesia.”] In *Ethnische Konflikte in der Dritten Welt. Ursachen und Konsequenzen* [“Ethnic conflicts in the Third World. Causes and consequences”], ed. by Günther Meyer and Andreas Thimm, 39-60. Mainz: University of Mainz.

Wieringa, Saskia. 1988. “Aborted Feminism in Indonesia. A History of Indonesian Socialist Feminism.” In *Women’s Struggles and Strategies*, ed. by Saskia Wieringa, 69-89. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.

—. 1992. “Ibu or the Beast. Gender Interests in Two Indonesian Women’s Organizations.” *Feminist Review* 41: 98-113.